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The Climb (平装)
by Anatoli Boukreev, G. Weston Dewalt
| Category:
Outdoors, Nature, Adventure, Everest |
| Market price: ¥ 168.00
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| MSL Pointer Review:
A first-person account of the harrowing climbing experience in May 1996 on Mount Everest, a tragedy that resulted in the deaths of eight people. |
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AllReviews |
1 Total 1 pages 9 items |
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Michael Parfit (The New York Times Book Review) (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
The Climb... is a breath of brisk, sometimes bitter clarity... It reads like an investigator's report, using uneven devices... The result is raw but powerful. |
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Chicago Tribune (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
Boukreev heroically rescued several climbers from certain death... [The Climb] gives an excellent account of the May 1996 disaster.
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Kirkus Reviews (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
Mountain guide Boukreev tells his version of the events of the May 1996 Mt. Everest disaster, in which five climbers died, in an effort to clear his name of damning allegations made in Jon Krakauer's bestselling Into Thin Air. Boukreev is well known in climbing circles as a good, tough, experienced guide, not especially personable or given to pampering the clients, but utterly reliable, especially in tight situations. So it came as a shock when Krakauer called into question Boukreev's behavior on that fateful day: Why had the guide raced down the mountain before his clients? Was it because he was improperly dressed and climbing without supplemental oxygen? Was it true he "cut and ran" when needed most, as charged by a Boukreev client whom Krakauer quotes? Boukreev provides a detailed history of his team's expedition (the book is told as an alternating duet, with Boukreev doing the play-by-play and investigative filmmaker DeWalt handling long swaths of color commentary), of the things that went right on the climb and the many that went wrong, as well as a minute examination of his climbing philosophy. And he successfully parries Krakauer's accusations: He was appropriately dressed and has photos to prove it; he climbs without supplemental oxygen because he feels it makes him stronger, not weaker, especially in situations where oxygen runs out; and, indeed, oxygen was fast running out for his clients, which is why he hurried down, with the consent of his team's leader, to be prepared to ferry tanks back up if needed. Not that the book is without its own glitches, such as inconsistency ("You can receive a lot more information observing the clients' external appearance" and "Appearances meant nothing'"). Such a pall of anger and defensiveness hangs over Boukreev's account that only those with a personal interest in his reputation will find much solace in his story. |
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L. Carol (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
Following Jon Krakauer's gripping first-hand account in Into Thin Air, and his pointed accusatory remarks surrounding Anatoli Boukreev's role in the rescue event, I had to read Anatoli's The Climb back to back in a bid to suss out what actually happened in the 1996 Mt. Everest tragedy.
Anatoli's book did not disappoint. It is true that readers may not experience the same sense of urgency and readability in Anatoli's book vis-à-vis Jon's account, as Jon was indeed a very good story-teller (although his over-generous use of quotable quotes/excerpts were irksome). The Russian mountaineer's book, even with all the flaws of it being penned by a third party who never climbed the slopes of Everest, not least in a prose that lacked the same page-turning qualities as Jon's book, it was more than made up for by the refreshing rawness of Anatoli's candor. Reading about the event from Anatoli's perspective made you feel that you were amongst the party of the Mountain Madness team, unlike Jon's version where readers remained outsiders or mere voyeurs. Reading about Anatoli's recollection made Jon's words appeared fraught with sensationism and naiveté. While Jon oftentimes tried to justify his actions or views in what later proved to be clouded or colored (either by his lack of high altitude experience or his complex against paid clients of higher social/financial standing or a mixture of both), Anatoli cut to the chase and enriched readers in many facets: inevitability of why high-altitude mountaineers are driven into leading commercial expedition to finance their life-long passion of summiting higher and more dangerous peaks; what constitutes successful acclimatization and the use/safety of supplemental oxygen; his heroic act of selflessness when he saved three lives in his team under what was no less than near-hell circumstances.
Anatoli's book is also a formidable rebuttal to Jon's comments in Into Thin Air which might have been biased and unfeeling at best and slanderous at worst. To any dedicated high-altitude climber, reputation is of paramount importance - and having read Jon's highly addictive best-seller, I totally understand why Anatoli had to put his story in print to debunk some of the myths/errors present in Jon's account. At the end of Anatoli's book, our views of what had happened on May 10th, 1996 would be less one-sided and our unfavorable views on Anatoli take an abrupt about-turn. This is an important process for readers seeking a more well-rounded view of what really happened on that fateful day. After all, one undisputed fact remains: no paid clients on the 1996 Mountain Madness' team perished, and mostly, if not entirely, to Anatoli's credit. |
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Raymond Martin (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
I have read almost all of the published accounts of this tragic season and found Boukreev's to be the most detailed and honest of the bunch. Like most of us, I first read Krakauer's Into Thin Air and was appalled at Anatoli's behavior as described by the author. I still agree with Krakauer that Boukreev should not have attacked the mountain in the manner in which he did (ahead of all the clients) but it's VERY evident from reading other accounts about this disaster that Anatoli was doing what he believed he should be doing.
When I first began reading The Climb, it felt like somewhat of a rebuttal to Into Thin Air and it's evident that there are passages throughout the book that are meant to defend against statements made in Krakauer's account. In fact, I firmly believed I would not like the book because of Krakauer's interpretation of Boukreev's behavior on the mountain.
After completing this book, I re-read Krakauer's book and felt that his criticisms of Boukreev were a bit harsh, particularly harping on Anatoli's choice to not use oxygen. Most formidable high-altitude mountain guides DO use oxygen when guiding even if they choose not to use when they are climbing for their own pleasure and doctors will tell you that it's ludicrous to believe that one would be better off or even as well off without supplemental oxygen as they would with it; however, most experienced high-altitude mountaineers will also tell you that being on oxygen and running out is WORSE than never having used oxygen at all. Eric Simonson has said that running out of oxygen at high altitude is equivalent to putting your head inside a plastic bag and duct-taping it around your neck. Anatoli always stated that, as a guide using oxygen, he might need to give it up his oxygen (which he did carry) to a needy client which would greatly hinder his ability to guide. Boukreev was one of those rare humans who are physiologically suited for high altitude and besides, at no time did Anatoli's lack of oxygen have any bearing on the way he guided that day.
It's evident from reading his book that Boukreev firmly believed if you were on Mt. Everest then you should be capable of climbing it. He was very much against the idea of "babysitting" clients with questionable mountaineering skills up a mountain that they had no business being on. One odd thing about Boukreev is that he was almost like half-Sherpa and half-guide. He assisted with hauling gear to the higher camps and fixed rope in several difficult areas along the route. Krakauer seemed to exaggerate the altercations that Anatoli had with Scott Fischer, however, Krakauer was able to see that Fischer was being affected by the altitude where Boukreev recognizes that Fischer is tired, but still trusts Fischer to make crucial decisions on summit day, the biggest of which was allowing Boukreev to descend ahead of the clients to prepare provisions for the climbers in the event that he needed to head back up the mountain in a rescue effort. Of course, one detail that Krakauer left out or wasn't aware of was that Boukreev believed that the team had NO sherpas left at Camp IV and that someone would need to prepare tea for the exhausted incoming climbers and insure that they got oxygen, hydration, etc. Also, if a rescue from Camp IV were necessary, he needed to rehydrate and rest himself in order to go back up the mountain. As we all know, this is exactly what occurred. So, it may have been flawed thinking, but he BELIEVED that he was doing the right thing and it was agreed upon between he and Fischer that this would be the plan. If he can be faulted at all, it might be for not recognizing that Scott Fischer was probably incapable of making a clear decision in his altitude-affected state. That being said, Scott Fischer was not one to let on that he was hurting and he was Boukreev's boss. Many of us don't question our bosses when we believe they may be making a bad decision.
After re-reading Into Thin Air, I realized that there were big gaps in Krakauer's account, not the least of which is his trek from the top of the Hillary Step to the South Summit without oxygen. In Krakauer's book, he mentions how Andy Harris has turned his oxygen up instead of down like he asked him to do and then he ran out of oxygen. Then he says that the "Step" cleared, he went down and then he goes into his encounter with Andy Harris at the South Summit oxygen cache. In The Climb, Boukreev tells of how Krakauer nearly fell to his death stumbling across the unroped area along the South ridge in his oxygen-deprived state. Krakauer never makes mention of this and probably because he doesn't remember it. Let's not forget that Krakauer thought Martin Adams was Andy Harris and actually communicated to Base Camp that Harris had safely returned to Camp IV when, in fact, Harris was somewhere around the South Summit.
It is my opinion that Krakauer was much more severely affected by the high altitude on that day than Boukreev was and, as a result, I trust Anatoli's memory of the events more than I do that of Krakauer even if The Climb was written in rebuttal to Into Thin Air. It goes without saying that had Anatoli not guided the mountain in the manner which he did, that more people would have died in those days and the altitude-affected recollection of John Krakauer isn't enough to convince me that the opposite is true. One thing that all climbers on that mountain will agree on is that if there is a villain in this tragic story, it was Ian Woodall, leader of the South African expedition. |
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Erik Bruchez (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
Many have read Into Thin Air by Jon Krakauer, the true story of a disastrous day on Mount Everest in May 1996, when several expeditions were caught in a storm that killed eleven people, including team leaders Scott Fisher and Rob Hall.
Krakauer's best-seller is a fantastic read that has inspired many. At the same time, while Krakauer acknowledges Russian mountain guide Anatoli Boukreev's heroic efforts to rescue fellow climbers, he criticizes many of his actions prior to the rescue. This situation motivated Boukreev and DeWalt's attempt to rectify the facts in The Climb.
Krakauer was climbing with the expedition of Hall's Adventure Consultants, and his account reflects in great part that point of view. Most casualties occurred in Hall's expedition, and Krakauer was on the front line to describe them. The Climb on the other hand tells the story from the point of view of Boukreev, who guided with the expedition of Fisher's Mountain Madness. Consequently, Boukreev spends less time on Hall's expedition, and more on his own, including an interesting account of his involvement with the preparation of the expedition.
Boukreev's point of view is that above 8,000 meters, you cannot be a guide anymore, at least not in the traditional sense of the term. You cannot constantly hold the clients by the hand. This is the basis of Boukreev's defense of his actions in the 1996 expedition. While he rarely shows any willingness to admit being wrong, he does recognize that his poor command of English at the time of the expedition became an obstacle on the mountain, a situation he had not anticipated.
What will convince the reader of Boukreev's professionalism is the long description of his expedition to Everest in 1997. In that expedition, as a "consultant" for an Indonesian team of climbers, he shows by example how the mistakes made by Fischer and Hall could be avoided with good planning. For example, he made sure that a Camp V would be installed and provided with enough oxygen on summit day (it turned out that Camp V was actually used by the descending team). He also insisted that he should have total control of the clients on the summit day.
Bad luck played a role in the 1996 expedition and appears to have led to Fisher's unexpected exhaustion, or even, as suggested in The Climb, HACE (High Altitude Cerebral Edema). However the book also points to the fact that the planning of Fisher and Halls's expeditions was sub-par (case in point, the fact that clients were still climbing after 2 PM on summit day, without a clearly communicated turnaround time, without radios, and without spare oxygen supply).
Fisher and Hall's deaths are utterly tragic. Both were good men and respected mountaineers, and Boukreev's admiration for them did not falter after the tragedy. But The Climb shows that as team leaders on the Everest in 1996, they probably deserve more criticism than Boukreev does as a guide. It is sad that Boukreev himself died in an avalanche in December 1997.
While most of the book is written by DeWalt, I was impressed by the amount of material narrated by Boukreev himself. These sections are edited from conversations between DeWalt and the guide. In addition, the crucial moments of the rescue on the South Col are presented as an unedited conversation between DeWalt and Boukreev. Content from the "debriefing tapes", recorded by nine expedition members a few days after the tragic events, is also directly quoted. There should be little doubt that DeWalt respects Boukreev's ideas.
The Climb is by no means as well written as Into Thin Air. It is also less dramatic, provides less historical and technical background on Mount Everest, and does not picture the general situation on the mountain in May 1996 as well as Krakauer does. For these reasons, it is probably a good idea to read Into Thin Air first, but The Climb remains an excellent and easy read that nicely complements Krakauer's opus. |
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Eric Franklin (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
This is a book for the adventuresome. While the writing is not as polished as the effort by Krakauer, it does indeed convey what it needs to, adequately enough that an interesting story unfolds. At the very heart of the book are interesting questions about the commercialization of high altitude climbing (nowhere more obscenely displayed than on Everest) and the commitment level of those that choose to undertake such a climb. Everest attracts thrill-seekers, as well as those who want to engage a challenge. Anatoli Boukreev, lead climber on the Mountain Madness team, definitely falls into the latter camp (as do most mountain guides). As someone that worked up to big mountain climbs over many years of climbing, continuously pushing his self-reliance in a measured manner, he is the epitome of what is to be a climber. The clients he led on Everest, however, came from various backgrounds, with varied levels of conditioning, mountain proficiency, etc.
As much as Everest clients may believe that they have an understanding of the danger and hardship that such a climb proposes, it is difficult to do so without the context that comes from years of experience.
This book was written as a rebuttal to claims made by Krakauer in his book but its true rewards to the reader lie elsewhere. The sad truth of the matter is that only the individuals on the mountain will ever really know what was running through their own heads at the time that critical decisions were made. Having a coherent thought above 8,000 meters is enough of a challenge without having the lives of clients in your hands.
At some point, a decision was made for Anatoli to descend in front of his clients. We will never know whether this was right or wrong, but we do know its outcome. Anatoli, as a mountaineer, is legendary, and this book gives real insight into how he climbed and the way he thought about and appreciated the mountains in which he lived. Regardless of the questions surrounding his descent, he ended up saving lives and making repeated forays into conditions where others would not/could not dare. For those of you with similar climbing appreciation or interests, the book is great reading on solely those grounds. |
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David Robertson (MSL quote), Canada
<2007-02-08 00:00>
I have read both John Krakauer's Into Thin Air and Anatoli Bookreev's The Climb. They are both good reading but differ in content. Krakauer is a writer and an average climber. Bookreev was a pure climber... one of the elite. I say 'was' because he died on a climb.
Krakauer comes across to me as being relatively immature. It bothered me deeply that he attacked Bookreev as he did, in what I felt was an overdone, emotional manner. It seems to me there was more to Krakauer's venom than just the fact that Bookreev left earlier than others from the summit. There seems to be a professional jealousy.
To summarize briefy, Krakauer and Bookreev were on different assault teams. There had been a lot of bad decisions made prior to the assault by both teams, and the climbers reaching the summit were poorly organized and lead. There was a loose agreement on the time to leave the summit, around 2:00 PM, yet many were just arriving there much later. People were still up there very late in the afternoon.
Bookreev, a very experienced climber, was on the summit early and feeling nervous about the late arrival of climbers. In my estimation, he made the correct decision to go down. He was the most experienced and professional person on the summit. Most of the rest were disorganized and straggling, and my impression from both books was that of a nirvanic chaos.
Although Bookreev was not using oxygen, he seemed to be thinking more clearly than Krakauer. The latter actually had difficulty with his oxygen and rushed down the mountain in a panic. Although he criticized Bookreev harshly for abandoning his clients, Krakauer did nothing for his fellow climbers. He watched his own rear end.
It's too easy to claim Bookreev had forsaken his clients. He had cleared his descent with Scott Fischer, the team leader, and his reasoning was sound. He wanted to be fresh in case of an emergency. As it turned out, his premonition was correct. Later that night, in a fierce storm, Bookreev was single-handedly responsible for saving several lives. At the same time, Krakauer was nowhere to be seen, although he had arrived in camp earlier.
Krakauer's alibi was his exhaustion. Perhaps if he's been less arrogant, he would have seen Bookreev heading down and gone with him. They both passed at the foot of the Hillary step on the way down. But Krakauer was fumbling due to his ineptness. His oxygen apparatus was not functioning well. Meanwhile, Bookreev, without oxygen and with a coherent mind, had summitted and passed Krakauer.
My lasting impression of Krakauer is that of a man who was humbled badly on his attempt and looking for a scapegoat. Although he summitted, in my eyes he failed. Bookreev was the real hero. It is questionable that he left clients up top. But I understand the decision he was forced to make under adverse conditions. You don't hang around and die, as did Rob Hall, because your clients have been unable to cope.
Their can be no villains in such a tragedy. Yet, the team leaders, Fischer and Hall, made some poor decisions that lead to the tragedy. Why did Krakauer single out Bookreev for the blame? People on Krakauer's team died too. Was that Bookreev's fault? They were not his clients. It was Rob Hall who messed up big time by not ensuring his clients were off the summit in time. And it was Scott Fischer's fault ultimately for letting down the member's on his team, one of whom was Bookreev. Fischer had allowed himself to become physically run down, a condition which no doubt cost him his life and the team it's leader.
In conclusion, both books are well worth the read. |
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Richard Forsyth (MSL quote), USA
<2007-02-08 00:00>
Although it's been some time since I read that book, I remember well how my opinion of Boukreev was changed by his forthright and believable explanation about the events of May 10, 1966. I believe he knew instinctively a disaster was in the making if the weather turned sour, and it certainly did. The firm 2:00 turnaround time was disregarded by practically everybody there. If the experts present, namely Hall and Fischer chose to ignore that rule, then the less experienced people would do the same. Leadership by example. Boukreev was smart enough to know he would contribute very little if he had remained in the vicinity of the summit and die with the rest. It was much better to retire to the sidelines and preserve his strength, not to speak of his life, and offer assistance, oxygen and other support when no one else would have been able to. Fischer knew it and condoned the plan. Krakhaur made a hasty and unfair judgement of Boukreev which bordered on character assassination. You can hardly blame Boukreev for being a little testy about it. Krakauer made his own contribution to the misery of others with his observation of having seen someone thought to be missing walking toward camp and reporting this news to the climbers family when in reality the climber had fallen off, if I'm not mistaken, the Kangshung face.
Krakauer knew that Beck Evers had miraculously made it back to camp but didn't bother to check on him during the ensuing night. Weathers spent the night in high-velocity sub-zero winds in a damaged tent unable to get his jacket on because, as I recall, it was tangled in his watch. Krakauer's reaction when he found Evers alive the next morning amounted to... "Well, I'll be darned!" and Evers remarked with his dry humor "What does a fellow have to do to get some help around here."
Boukreev heroically and without regard to his own safety located the lost climbers who had strayed in the wrong direction and were huddled in the wind and ice. Several people who would have almost certainly died, lived as a result of Boukreev's efforts. How many did Krakauer haul in? Yet, the implication is that Boukreev was a coward who ran back to camp to save his own skin. And there may be some truth to the fact that he might have been concerned about his own safety. Self preservation is not stupidity and I don't care if he was a guide, he had no obligation to make a great show of dying for his clients. Those people knew enough to be aware you don't hang around on top of Everest socializing and patting each other on the back for very long. Certainly not until four or five oclock in the afternoon. Anyway, that's my view and I believe Krakauer did Boukreev a great injustice. This book cleared it up.
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1 Total 1 pages 9 items |
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