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Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian) (平装)
by B. H. liddell Hart
| Category:
Strategy, Military strategy |
| Market price: ¥ 138.00
MSL price:
¥ 118.00
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MSL rating:
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| MSL Pointer Review:
Written in a lucid manner, thorough and full of life, this is an exceptional treatise on strategy. |
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AllReviews |
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Library Journal (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time. |
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Zaidi (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
Adjust your end to your means.
Clear sight and cool calculation should prevail. Do not bite off more than you can chew. Keep a clear sense of what is possible. Face facts while preserving faith. Confidence will be of no avail if the troops are run down.
Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances
Recognize that alternatives exist but make sure they all bear on the object. Weigh the feasibility of attaining an objective against its contribution to the attainment of the end in mind.
Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.
Put yourself in your opposition's shoes and try to see what course of action he will see as least probable and thus not try to forestall.
Exploit the line of least resistance - so long as it can lead you to any objective that would contribute to your underlying object.
Seize on opportunity - but not any opportunity. Tactically, this refers to following up on success; strategically, it refers to the management and deployment of your reserves.
Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives.
Choose a single course of action that could have several objectives; do not let your actions reveal your objectives. This puts your opponent on the horns of a dilemma. It introduces uncertainty regarding that which is to be guarded against.
Ensure that both plans and dispositions are flexible - adaptable to circumstances.
Include contingencies or next steps - for success as well as failure. Organize and deploy your resources in ways that facilitate adaptation to either.
Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard - whilst he is well placed to parry or evade it.
Unless your opponent is much inferior, do not attack until he has been disorganized and demoralized. Psychological warfare precedes physical warfare. Similarly, physical warfare can be psychological in nature.
Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed.
If at first you don't succeed, give up. Your reinforcements will likely be matched by the enemy. Moreover, successfully repulsing you the first time will morally strengthen him for the second.
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An American reader (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
When I first flipped through the book and read the reviews, it looked as if I was going to be getting into some serious in-depth and perceptive analysis. But the more I read of it, the more it started to sound like a high school thesis essay: Hart starts with a single, simple thesis - that one should be indirect as opposed to direct - and, evidently owing to his insecurity due to previous encounters with skeptics, feels obligated to devote the entire 500-odd page book to monotonously proving this point. He never goes into more depth into an area of history than the bare minimum he needs to make his argument, and his argument is always the same, showing precious little depth or insight. A concurrent disadvantage is that there is never enough info given on any historical incident that one would be able to draw any real independent conclusions, and therefore one is obliged to take his word for it.
Basil basically thinks that he is amazingly smart and perceptive to realize that in war it is generally advantagious to be indirect - to strike at weak points, take unexpected paths, try to imbalance your enemy etc. When I was twelve years old, having only gathered the barest of the bare snippits of military history in my head, and playing wargames (which I happened to not be very good at at the time), I figured this out pretty quickly. So basically I don't know about anyone else, but in my percpetion the Hart's thesis is a basic and obvious fact of strategy, and no one should need 500 pages to convince them of this.
whether moves were direct or indirect - there is no room for other factors, other figurings, other causes in his mind. He provides no room in his mind for the advantages of direct, orthodox strategies, and it apperently never occurs to him that there are usually good reasons (i.e. other than stupidity, which seems to be his opinion), why orthodox strategies are orthodox. It would be nice if we could always have an incompetent foe who would allow us to outflank him and be led by the nose, but this is not always possible - war is the realm of the pragmatist, and the theories and ideas forwarded in this book are filthily romantic.
In closing, I would say that Hart indeed forwards many good ideas, and gives many good examples, but these are in the muddle with such a shallow and careless mess that you would be better off simply reading REAL classics, such as Sun Tzu, and then studying military history in depth, and drawing your own conclusions based on these. I do not feel that B. H. Liddell Hart's book is truly worth it in any dimension. |
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An American reader (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
"Business", "Theatre", or "Politics"; that B.H. Liddell Hart was a soldier and a military theorist/historian rather than businessman, a playwright or a politician is the only reason this work is not otherwise so named, and thus focused. His own limited martial experience, later enlightened and informed by exhaustive professional study, enabled his use of the history of warfare for a verdant field of analogy, metaphor and example. An alternate approach to the study of waging war is expressly not his chief intent, however. Advocacy for the "indirect approach" is his ultimate purpose.
Unlike many military writers, ancient and modern, who reduce their theories to slim maxims out of "superficial obfuscation" more often than "genuine profundity" Liddell Hart's readers are treated to illustrations from the Hoplites of classical Greece, to the hydrogen bomb and the early Cold War. That the "consequences of failure in war are greater than in any other human enterprise", Liddell Hart's use of military examples is especially useful in communicating his main; though not necessarily exclusively military, premise.
The author does not offer a cursory introduction and overview to military history and strategy, but he carefully selects and examines contests of will, some of them bloodless, which convincingly support his central theme: the superiority of "expending brains instead of blood", of "fighting with the legs instead of the fists". Moving always along the "line of least expectation" and striking with the greatest surprise. A commander's grasp of the "indirect approach"; while quantifiable in material and geographic victories, is best understood through its impact psychologically - the havoc and confusion it achieves in the mind of the opponent.
The aim of "grand strategy" then is the engineering of conditions, circumstances and perceptions which make ultimate defeat of an enemy on the battlefield an historic inevitability or a mere useful finality for a specific contest.
Though every vignette is culled from military history, minimum imagination and extrapolation will yield the obvious applicability of the "indirect approach" to business, romance, entertainment or politics - any field of human endeavor where one will contends for supremacy or influence over another.
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An American reader (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
The best book on strategy that I've ever read. I know that doesn't mean anything to you, but it was also the best book on strategy that Heinz Guderian ever read (the German Panzer commander that conquered most of Europe at the start of WW2.)
The whole book is summed up by THE INDIRECT APPROACH (i.e. never, ever, do what the enemy would logically assume that you will do.) Always make it look like there are several targets that you are planning to attack- and throw your whole weight against the least likely at the last moment.
It was this book that gave me a full appreciation of the Byzantine General Belisarius. This is the general that briefly reconquered the the western empire, but was stupidly recalled by a jealous emperor that feared his genius and success. Briefly, Belisaurius, would break through and operate far behind enemy lines. His entire army was mounted. He was forced to live off the land because he was far from his bases, and faced with an unreliable and jealous emperor. He would strike out between two possible targets, putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma, and vear off to strike one of them only at the last possible moment. He would take what supplies he needed and burn the rest. He would repeat this over and over again. If he found a suitalble location to fortify he would do so. He would let his pursuers catch up and bleed their strength off in direct frontal attack on his fortified position (held by dismounted armored cataphracts and horse archers.) Then, he would simply mount up, break out, and start the whole thing over until his enemy was exhausted and ready for decisive defeat.
Needless to say, this is a pattern readily modified to fit armored and mechanised warfare.
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An American reader (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
An early tank warfare theorist, Liddell Hart championed the cause of mobility in the field and rapid deployment. Largely ignored by the British, his theories were put into practice by the German High Command, which was influenced by Liddell Hart in their plans for Blitzkrieg in WWII. It wasn't until the North African Campaign, when O'Connor rolled backed Graziani's "grey tide" of Italians by rapid movement, capturing thousands of previously victorious Axis troops, that the British took Liddell Hart seriously enough to put his theories to use on the offensive. When the Americans arrived, the Allies were ready to face Rommel, who had also steeped himself in Liddell Hart's theories. The drama of the campaign in central North Africa is, in part, the drama of two sides using different versions of the author's theories. In "Strategy," we have the thoughts of the mature man, one who has seen that the atomic bomb can stop a rapid deployment in its tracks, and who realizes that the West's military superiority over the rest of the world will end with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons are now available to frequent military rivals India and Pakistan (whose "Islamic Bomb" secrets were recently transmitted to other Muslim nations by one of the bomb's designers), and to North Korea -- which had fought the West to a bloody standstill in Liddell Hart's lifetime. The old theories of rapid deployment which were the hallmark of Liddell Hart's earlier thought are STILL believed in by many military leaders, ready, as so often, to fight the LAST war over again. Liddell Hart's too brief comments about war in the age of nuclear weapons are all the more important to us today, lest we find ourselves caught up in an unwinnable war because of poor strategy. Liddell Hart's conclusions on "industrial bombing" were that it was NOT a useful means of warfare. We may suggest, based upon very recent military experience, that today's aerial campaign of "awe and terror" rapidly lead's to tommorrow's "guerrila war" on the ground, down and dirty, and very, very bloody.
Liddell Hart's chapter on "Guerilla War" helps to illustrate the bloody catastrophes of the Viet Nam era and the current insurgency in Iraq.
"Strategy" is a bit out-of-date, but a wise reader can discern where Liddell Hart's theories WOULD have led had he lived a few years longer. I rate "Stragey" 5 stars, up from my earlier rating of 4 stars, which I gave it before the Iraq "insurgency" showed that Basil Liddell Hart knew his stuff: the war is unfolding as "Strategy" suggests that it would. This book is A MUST READ for anyone interested in strategy, whether for playing war games or waging a real war.
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An American reader (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
I have an original edition of this book and found it useful to read at odd moments. As a naval oficer and one-time World History teacher, I found the early parts of the book fascinating and useful. And by the time Hart reaches his discussion of the age of Justinian and the re-conquest of the Roman Empire by Belisarius, one really has learned quite a bit about Western Civilization and its war history.
The chapter on Belisarius should be committed to memory by all of the current administration's strategic advisors should, because it was Belisarius who developed the Byzintine Empires strategy of winning wars by not "fighting" them.
Belisarius realized that a defeated Roman Empire could re-emerge as a great threat to Constantinople, as could the re-energized Persian Empire and the numerous babarian states surrounding Byzantium. And even with its great position as a world culture and trading capital, neither Justinian nor his empire could afford to engage every threat directly. Therefore, surrogates, feints and his age's version of "gunboat diplomacy" was much more cost effective. In fact Belisarius was one of the most effective generals of all time, even though his actual field leadership experience in battle was relatively limited.
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An American reader (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
This is a brilliant book. The author surveys history's greatest campaigns to illustrate the "indirect approach" and the virtues of mobility in both offense and defense. Mostly the secret is about avoiding contact until you can position your forces in such a way that victory is assured or almost assured. Unfortunately this book is not meant for the casual reader. It's difficult to read and requires a lot of thought to properly absorb the author's concepts. Moreover, the author assumes the reader knows much of the history of several battles and the leading figures.
Some may argue that outflanking an opponent is obvious and hardly worth the long chapters that Liddell Hart devotes to it. It's true that the object is to dislocate an enemy's defenses by taking the route of least resistance to turn the opponent's moral and physical position. Yet this misses the crucial point. The route of least resistance is the route of least expectation. Making the route of least expectation one that puts your forces in a superior position requires knowing the mind of the opposing general. Then you must lure your opponent by playing on those expectations, or altering his expectations in a way that promotes your intentions. As an example, Liddell Hart takes Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, where the French leader lured the Russian's into a valley by presenting them with a relatively weak force, then he reinforced this perception of weakness by sending an offer of peace to the Austrians (the Russian's ally). Next, Napoleon lured the Russians to extend their left wing by presenting another seemingly "vulnerable" target before he struck at a crucial joint in the Russian lines and created such a decisive victory that Austria surrendered within 24 hours.
If you choose to read this book, prepare to spend a good amount of time considering the subtlety of the author's concepts, or else you will find it disappointing.
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Rodrigo Fenton (MSL quote), Mexico
<2007-01-10 00:00>
I want to start by saying that I recommend this book to people that like to read about military history and strategy; however, I am not that high on this book as other reviewers.
Strategy was written with the purpose to prove one thing: battles and wars are normally won by unbalancing the enemy at all the levels, a strategy the author coins as the "Indirect Approach", not by attacking him directly. The book has two sections, one which narrates the history of warfare from the Persian Wars all the way to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. The second section postulates the principles of Indirect Approach and "revisions" on Von Clausewitz's postulates.
That said, unlike other reviewers, I believe that there are two landmark books on War better than this one, Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Von Clausewitz's On War. While Liddell Hart had the benefit of living on the time when Von Clausewitz's war "premises" were revised after the massacres of WWI, and Liddell Hart is one of the grandfathers of modern tank warfare, I think his concept of "Indirect Approach" is a modernization of Sun Tzu's principles on deception in warfare. That is why I think this book does not have the theoretical value other reviewers want to give.
As for his historical evidence about the application of the "Indirect Approach", I think many accounts are based on biased reports that don't truly tell us the complete picture (for more on this, I recommend Hans Delbruck's History of Warfare series, which is the best I've read). If this is correct it would undermine the supposedly "overwhelming" evidence of his theory. I would add, however, that his description of WWII is extraordinary and I consider it the best analysis on the overall conflict I've ever read.
Overall, I think two thing makes the book worthy. First, the Indirect Approach has the spirit of Sun Tzu in it. The way this concept clarify's some of the old precepts on the chinese manual about war is extraordinary. Besides, it completely modernizes the spirit of the "Art of War" and proves there are many ways to outclass an enemy and force him to make a mistake in modern times. It also presents a great principle on winning the Grand Strategy, in the realm of politics, before even considering victory at the Strategic and Tactical levels. I would recommend the book because of this and because of the great description on WWII. |
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James Sidey (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
This book was used by the Air Force for training 10 years ago; I don't know whether it still is (it certainly should be). The book is divided into two sections, a survey of military strategy from ancient history through the end of WWII, and then a summation and analysis of the lessons learned (with some discussion of the pros and cons of Clausewitz's On War). While a bit dense, the survey is important as it gives you a much better understanding of Liddell Hart's brilliant indirect approach.
Liddell Hart does not follow the Clausewitz-ian theory that "blood is the price of victory". Rather he views strategy as a way to minimize the need for armed conflict through moral and physical dislocation of ones enemy. He also keeps an eye on grand strategy and the quality of the peace that is to be achieved after a conflict (something that Clausewitz loses track of). |
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