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Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian) (平装)
by B. H. liddell Hart
| Category:
Strategy, Military strategy |
| Market price: ¥ 138.00
MSL price:
¥ 118.00
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| Stock:
Pre-order item, lead time 3-7 weeks upon payment [ COD term does not apply to pre-order items ] |
MSL rating:
 Good for Gifts |
| MSL Pointer Review:
Written in a lucid manner, thorough and full of life, this is an exceptional treatise on strategy. |
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AllReviews |
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David Sims (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
I apologize in advance for my lack of brevity, but to be fair to the author I feel that I must analyze this book at length.
While somewhat unimpressed by Hart's biography of Scipio Africanus, Hart's enviable reputation and the praise he garnered from some of our century's greatest generals encouraged me to give Strategy a chance. At first it looked like another disappointment, but I have come to appreciate this as a truly worthwhile book.
The bad first: The opening section of this book is an attempt by Hart to trace the entire history of Western warfare and demonstrate that in each era of history the indirect approach has worked better than direct assaults. For 143 pages he makes this point over and over again without adding any more detail. I quickly began to feel that he was oversimplifying events, and several times he seems to make very tenuous stretches between events and his theories. At other times it feels like he is attempting to stretch events to fit his theories when there is an insufficiently strong connection. He also seems to have an inadequate grasp of some of the historical periods. His knowledge of the American Civil War seemed a bit piecemeal to me, and his assertion that McClellan's indirect approach during the Peninsular campaign failed due to Lincoln's refusal to increase McClellan's forces does not match well with what I have heard from other sources, which blame McClellan's failure on his own hesitations.
After this section Hart enters into the period of the World Wars. Here he truly starts to shine. The campaigns are described in much greater detail and readers are treated to much better examples and explanations than previously. At last his theories can be envisioned and we hear something more detailed than the monotonous (if correct) repitition of the phrase "indirect approach."
After this excellent analysis of the World Wars, Hart moves on to discuss his theories. Here at last is the brilliance that had been promised. As irritated as I was with his history, his abstract writings were beautiful, concise, and thought-provoking. He is even-handed, imaginative, and rather than the over-simplification that I criticize him for in his earlier chapters he gives excellent and informative explanation. Of particular merit is his discussion of the limitations of Clausewitz (as commonly interpreted).
His final chapter discusses guerilla warfare and raises some fascinating questions about the downside of encouraging guerilla warfare against your enemies. While I think Hart might have erred on the side of caution here, the points he raises all have great merit and the fact that US-funded guerillas in Afghanistan later became a threat to the US bears out his warnings. My one criticism of this chapter is that it feels unfinished; he does not develop both sides of the argument and he does not suggest measures to help with the problems that he foresees.
On the whole, I find Hart to be an uninspiring historian but a brillian strategist and highly recommend this book for anyone who has an interest in grasping the true art of military matters.
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