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The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (平装)
by Paul Kennedy
| Category:
Current affairs, Global politics, Nonfiction |
| Market price: ¥ 208.00
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| MSL Pointer Review:
A mandatory reading for anyone who's attempting to get a good historical perspective about the role of the US in the modern world. |
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AllReviews |
1 Total 1 pages 8 items |
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Patrick Bernardy (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
Even though this work is 540 pages long and covers 500 years of world history, Kennedy's thesis is simple: the "Great Power" politics of the last 500 years has been dominated by a relative and interconnected relationship between a nation's economic base and its military strength. The more capable a nation (or coalition of nations, as was usually the case) is of sustaining, or even increasing, their economy before, and especially during, a war, the more likely that nation will be victorious. Kennedy shows (sometimes with exhaustive data, in both senses of that word) that in every period of international affairs since roughly 1500, the power which dominates does so because of vast economic resources.
The most important thing that needs to be said concerning the usefulness of this work is its "big picture" quality. It is useful, especially for a novice historian like myself, to view a period of history in such an interconnected way. To view the last 500 years of world history under the light of an economic struggle between Great Powers gives a linear quality to history, a cause-and-effect picture that one can insert dates, names, wars, treaties, and revolutions into at a later time. The power bids of the Habsburg, French, British, German, and American nations during this 500 years of history offers an interesting perspective, and one of Kennedy's secondary themes:
the five nations mentioned above were the most powerful economically and militarily during their bids, and what occurred (whether successful or not) was a coalition against them. It could be argued that the American-Soviet grapple was the ultimate expression of this trend of action-reaction seen since 1500, consuming not just Europe and its colonies, but an increasing proportion of the planet.
Unfortunately, I was very disappointed by the last 120 pages of this book. To be fair to Mr. Kennedy, he gave an adequate disclaimer that his future speculation was based on measurable and reliable economic trends and common-sense extrapolations, but that one can never predict the assassination of an archduke or the freak destruction of an overwhelming invading armada. That being said, it was still not very useful to me to read a hundred-plus pages concerning the future trends of economics and geopolitics with the knowledge that two years after the publication of this book, the one main assumption made by Kennedy-the continued existence of the Soviet Union and the further escalation of the Cold War-was incorrect. The fates of the five powers leading into the 21st Century (US, USSR, China, Japan, and the European Economic Union) as Kennedy describes them, hinged on the Soviet regime's participation, making this chapter ludicrously quaint in hindsight. For instance, if Japan had hit an economic slump (which it did), or China turned capitalist (which it hasn't yet, but it certainly isn't as Marxist as it once was), or if Europe continued to evolve into one massive trading block (which it did), none of these events, even taken together, would have made this last chapter irrelevant. But the one thing that does, the collapse of the Soviet Union (and its subsequent consequences for so many trends, like the arms race) did occur and shatters this wonderful work at its end. My advice to Mr. Kennedy is that he must remove the final chapter from this work, or update it
accordingly.
But perhaps he cannot; perhaps his thesis, in the era of terrorism and the Internet, is no longer valid in the new multi-faceted and quickening pace of modern politics. The 500-year military struggle between the Great Powers may very well be over, in favor of fringe-group attacks on a singular global trade network brought culturally closer everyday by communication technology. But then again, with religious fundamentalism increasing, not only in the Middle East but in America as well, maybe we will see a rebirth of that monumentally ridiculous mechanism for war. In other words, don't count out humanity. We will always find ways to make war on one another, even if we have to dust off some old classics.
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Belen Alcat (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
In this book, published in 1987, Kennedy's aim is to explain us the relationship among different forms of power: economic, political and military power. According to him, the economic power is the source of the other two.
Kennedy warns, however, that the relationship among them is quite fragile and never easy. For example, if a country spends too much money in order to increase his its military power (renforcing its political power), it will surely undermine its economic power (the original source of the other two).
In his opinion, the great powers are those states who can reach the best balance of military and economic strength, and he also thinks that as soon as they lose that ability they lose their place to another great power.
Kennedy shows us how this relationship has worked throughout time, and how much it has influenced on the balance of power between countries. He specifically studies the period from 1500 to the mid - 1980's, and even though he might concentrate too much on Europe (as he warns beforehand), he gets his point across quite well.
Some of Kennedy's predictions weren't accurate: he predicted the fall of USA as a great power, and believed that Japan would take its place. What is more, he wasn't able to foresee the fall of the Soviet Union, a few years after his book was published.
However, his ideas and his theory are quite good, and still valid, as is his warning regarding the danger of *Imperial overestretch* to the great powers (specifically USA).
I recommend this book to those who want to understand what is happening today. Even if it is somehow dated, many of its premises are still valid, and the historical perspective is almost flawless.
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James Pruett (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
Paul Kennedy'sRise and Fall of the Great Powers, is classic historical criticism with just a couple of main thoughts, one of them novel. First: it is strong underlying economies that ultimately determine the victor in a prolonged war (this is not new but it is nonetheless most thoroughly articulated here by Kennedy).
Second: it is the very requirements of maintaining a strong military and empire that causes a powerful nation to decline in power and prestige.
Kennedy's focus is on military conflict between 1500 and 2000, a time of great change in the global balance of power. Consider that in 1500, the Arab, Orient, and the West were on about equal footing, with the edge here probably given to the Ottoman Empire and to China. Arab invaders, for instance, were in Spain, Greece, and Vienna. The Chinese, already possessors of gunpowder, the printing press, and the compass. But in around 1500, the Western nations began taking the lead, charting a course of military and economic power that went global, changing hands through the nation states of Europe: Portugal, Spain, France, England, and later Germany.
Throughout the book, Kennedy's criticism, while oftentimes harsh (for instance with France and Italy during the First and Second World Wars), is fair and I think for the most part unbiased. His book is sweeping and scope and attempts perhaps too much. But at least it does not bog down in trivia. His focus is preponderantly on the economic military connection. Other forces examining the rise and decline of political and economic power are not examined here; consequently his book is one-sided and incomplete next the work of Spengler or Toynbee. Nonetheless, his work is of major importance. Imperial Overstretch is his innovation.
This book is certainly worth reading and should be a cornerstone of the economic historians library. The effect of this book clearly shows that economic power supports military/political power and the fragile relationship between the two. Almost 15 year old, this book is still relevant, although in need of update, particularly in relation to the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the rise of Anti-Western terrorism from the Muslim world. America's power, while perhaps less threatened by East Asian economic power than Kennedy's book suggests it would be, is nonetheless in the uncomfortable position of holding on to #1 in a world increasingly hostile to its every intention. Kennedy's book offers a great summary as to how these arrangements came into being and what we might expect in the near future. Their fluidness, he explains, indicate how fragile power is to maintain once you have it.
Pat Buchanan's book, Death of the West, I might suggest as a good follow up to this one. As Buchanan explains, the depopulation and demoralization of Europe/America/Japan are now the most critical issues affecting the changing world order and balance of power. One race, a people, a country, must constantly renew itself. Without that, the underlying is difficult if not impossible to grow.
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Brian Huff (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
I enjoyed The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers a great deal, despite its sometimes flawed statistical analysis. It helped put the last 500 years of European empires in perspective. It also did a great job of explaining why a powerful country often loses its power.
Kennedy discussed at length that the decline of power had little to do with absolute wealth: modern Spain and England have far more wealth today than they did when they were empires. The key is relative power, or how strong you are in comparison to your neighbors.
I especially enjoyed the discussion of post World War I Europe. It presented the best argument to date (including de Tocqueville) for why the US and Russia were destined to emerge as world powers after World War II.
Its biggest flaw is its publish date: 1989. Just before the Berlin Wall fell. So a great deal of the speculation in the last chapter is fairly worthless.
However, this book gives a fantastic grounding in the subject of geopolitics. I would recommend reading it alongside Collapse by Jared Diamond, and The Clash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington.
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FrKurt Messick (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
History is a wonderful study, a professor of mine once commented, of the interlocking circles of influence, whereby one can find often that an obscure arranged marriage in the Dark Ages could be responsible for a thermo- nuclear exchange or a hostile corporate takeover today.
Of course, he was exaggerating, but only by a matter of degrees. History is the study of the interconnexions of human beings in their actions over time, and to that end, the more we understand of the past, the better chance we have of surviving and flourishing into the future.
Paul Kennedy's book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers is an insightful, sweeping examination of the centuries of the growth and dominance and, lately, relative decline of the European powers over the rest of the globe. To a lesser extent (because they were lesser players) he draws in Asian, and finally, American players, although as will be seen, they began to play the game according to the European rules.
He pays particular attention to the economic and military aspects of the motivations of national and ethnic decision-making; so often history (or at least popular history) has portrayed such as purely political, religious (at least until the last few centuries), or royal-family intrigues. Kennedy explores the forgotten aspects in a popular format; hence the question (as the Gulf War is almost universally recognised as, in reality, a war of economic necessity rather than for political or moral purpose, which tended to be added later) - were the Hapsburgs responsible? Rather, that is a way of asking, are the same motivations that were at play with Great Power relationships in 1500 still at play today? Have we learned anything?
At the beginning of 1500, it was by no means certain that Europe would become the dominant region of powers in the world. China was in decline but still perhaps the greatest power. Empires in India, Japan, and around Muscovy were also contenders. To their detriment, however, each of these powers tended to be isolated and introspective, more concerned with internal consistency and preservation of 'a way of life', whereas the smaller European powers had to compete with each other, and adapt and improve to survive. 'This dynamic of technological change and military competitive- ness drove Europe forward in its usual jostling, pluralistic way.'
Occasionally, Europe tended toward the Asian models, particularly with the dominance of the Hapsburgs who, at their height, controlled much of Europe and began to insist on the same kinds of religious, historical, mercantile and cultural conformity that cost the other empires their vitality.
Great power struggles that occurred between 1660 and 1815 are difficult to characterise briefly, but chiefly is marked by the emergence of a cluster of powerful states which came to dominate diplomacy and militarily. After the Napoleonic era, there was a lull in Great Power warfare, until this century, when even the flank powers of Britain and Russia were a bit too central to the conflicts to survive with both military and economic strength intact.
'Given this book's concern with the interaction between strategy and economics, it seemed appropriate to offer a final (if necessarily speculative) chapter to explore the present disjuncture between the military balances and the productive balances among the Great Powers; and to point to the problems and opportunities facing today's five large politico-economic power centres...as they grapple with the age-old task of relating national means to national ends. The history of the rise and fall of the Great Powers has in no way come to a full stop.'
These Kennedy identifies as The United States, Japan, the EEC, the Russian States, and China. Of course, this has the possibility of shifting, too, as countries such as India and Brazil acquire more military and economic strength; countries such as Indonesia that are resource - and population -rich could also achieve Great Power status before long (historically speaking).
Kennedy pays homage to the Prussian historian Leopold von Ranke, who wrote about die grossen in 1833, following since the fall of Spain. Von Ranke also produces speculative chapters; perhaps it is natural for historians to want to chart the course of the future as well as mapping out the past.
This book reads like an epic, but is generally accessible (though somewhat intricate) and gives interesting insights, and is significant for what is does not address (many political scientists and historians will find some major theories ignored) as well as for the fresh approaches it does employ. Best read with other history books.
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Scott Compton (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
At the beginning of the book, Kennedy indicates that his inspiration for the book was a book by Leopold von Ranke which traced the economic with the political aspect of empire. There have been histories of the politics of empire, and histories of economics, but nothing which comprehensively plotted the economic, political, and technological aspects of empire against each other. I don't know if that is true - it is hard to imagine that Kennedy was the first, or that there isn't a large literature on the topic - but Kennedy succeeds at presenting a very persuasive story of the basis of political power in what was once called "economic substructure." For someone not very well versed in history like myself, Kennedy provides history the way I can understand it, not in terms of names and treaties and battles but on the basis of economic growth, openness to trade, and access to cheap and accessible energy and resources. He connects the grand strategies produced by England, France, the Hapsburg Empire, etc. with their economic systems. His account of the Prussian general staff, for instance, and their adoption of the new technology of rail transportation is a small but fascinating detail that had very large implications for the balance of power in middle Europe. That is the kind of detail that would probably be left out of most economic or political histories, but Kennedy plugs it into his account, together with a comparative overview of the GDP's of France, England, and Russia, to make clear the strategic position of Prussia in 1870. As an overview of the forces that drive histories and empire, Kennedy's book is the best that I have found. |
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Tsafos (MSL quote), USA
<2007-01-10 00:00>
It is unfortunate that this book's claim to fame has rested largely on its diagnosis of America's "imperial overstretch" and its prognosis of American decline, for the author writes repeatedly that this is not an exercise in political science, but in history. Instead, Paul Kennedy has tried to put together a sweeping history of the Great Powers from 1500 to 2000, and, only secondarily, to speculate on how the continuation of some broad historical trends might play out in the future.
The narrative takes off with the Habsburg bid for European hegemony, then traces the European balance of power that was ultimately upset by Napoleon's similar bid in the early nineteenth century, through the Congress of Vienna and the relative peace leading up to the unification of Germany, all the way to the two world wars and the cold war, only to end with a chapter on what the future might hold.
Brining all these historical events together is one of the book's prime assets, as is its ability to separate fact from analysis (though, it is written for people with definite knowledge of history). Devoting equal attention to politics, economics, geography, and technology is another, though the later chapters (on contemporary affairs) might suffer a bit on the economics side, especially on treating financial strength in a somewhat outdated form.
What stands out in the work, however, is its broader themes-how growth rates affect the pattern of international politics; Kennedy spends enough time to deal with countries specifically and analyze how they have coped with the various developments, internal and external, that have come their way. His general theory of overstretch - of a gap between a country's grand strategy and the resources it commits to bring it about - is particularly interesting to read (even if overstretch is easier to identify in hindsight than to specify when occurring).
Overall, there are few books there that can master an equal command of historical fact, global trends, and penetrating insight into such a wide range of human history and historiography. For that alone, The Rise and Falls of the Great Powers, deserves to be read, and read.
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A Canadian reader (MSL quote), Canada
<2007-01-10 00:00>
What I found most attractive about this book is that Kennedy uses clear statistics to back up his points and argument. His thesis, essentially, is that economic power is the foundation upon which all other sorts of power rest (ie. military power, hegemony). He shows, an incredible number of charts and statistics, how the shift of military power and relative hegemony since 1500 have all come on the heels of a shift in economic power.
All his charts and tables, filled with hard economic data, are difficult to refute. He does not make an important point using thought-experiments or appealling to intuition; he backs up his arguments with hard data. His writting is clear and easy, though at some points dry. It's really just a facinating study into how when economic wealth shifts from one power to another, military power and hegemony are soon to follow.
From the Habsburgs, to the Portugense, the Spanish, the Dutch, the French, the British, the German, to American empire, Kennedy shows precisely with economic data when, how, and why these empires rose and collapsed.
This is truly and important book. While some reviewers here seem not to think so, one can't ignore his arguments and thesis when they are supported by such a range of hard data, which is this book's greatest asset. Great book, great thesis based on abundant hard, empirical evidence, absolute classic.
My minor criticisms are that he assumes knowledge on the part of the reader. Such as that the reader is generally aware of what the, for example, Crimean War was.
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1 Total 1 pages 8 items |
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