Author: John W. Dower

Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company

Pub. in: June, 2000

ISBN: 0393320278

Pages: 680

Measurements: 9.1 x 6.1 x 1.2 inches

Origin of product: USA

Order code: BA01160

Other information: ISBN-13: 978-0393320275

Dower describes the pathos of Japan's defeat and its difficult post-war journey to remake itself and its society - the backside of WWII in the Pacific. In the 1860's Emperor Meiji embarked upon a similar, but deliberate, journey. In this case, it was ignominiously thrust upon the Japanese. Dower uses a prodigious amount of detail and cultural insight. Deeply researched and well written, it's far ranging and often poignant as it captures the post-surrender chaos and struggles. It is also pragmatic and evenhanded.

The opening chapters are a tour of a defeated nation. The Japanese, a once proud people, were utterly crushed by the Allies. In the war's waning days they were clearly on their last legs, and like a boxer staggered by an overwhelming opponent, they were carrying on the fight by sheer will. "In this all-consuming milieu, the immediate meaning of 'liberation' for most Japanese was not political but psychological. Surrender...liberated them from death. Month after month, they had prepared for the worst; then, abruptly, the tension was broken. In an almost literal sense they were given back their lives. Shock bordering on stupefaction was a normal response to the emperor's announcement, usually followed quickly by an overwhelming sense of relief. But that sense of relief all too often proved ephemeral. Exhaustion and despair followed quickly in its train - a state of psychic collapse so deep and widespread that...[t]he populace, it was said, had succumbed to the 'kyodatsu condition.'" (88-89)

Our occupation was quintessentially American with a missionary zeal. "For all its uniqueness of time, place, and circumstance - all its peculiarly 'American' iconoclasm - the occupation was in this sense but a new manifestation of the old racial paternalism that historically accompanied the global expansion of the Western powers. Like their colonialist predecessors, the victors were imbued with a sense of manifest destiny. They spoke of being engaged in the mission of civilizing their subjects. They bore the burden (in their own eyes) of their race, creed, and culture. They swaggered, and were enviously free of self-doubt." (211-212). Dower includes a fascinating discussion of an interesting dilemma facing America: how to break away from the racist vilification of the Japanese by wartime propaganda and now show that the Japanese could measure up to sustaining a democratic form of government.
For the most part this book is exactly as the title states: how Japan embraced defeat. There is precious little directly about how the US administered Japan. It is not devoid of it, however. There is fascinating insight on how and why MacArthur used the Emperor's position during the war and during the Occupation (see chapter 7, especially 282-283 and 286). In the days immediately following surrender, "An alien from another planet...might easily have concluded that Emperor Hirohito had ascended the throne in August 1945 just in time to end a terrible war, and that no one's feelings other than his mattered" (287). Also, one gets a sense of the breadth and depth of the American occupation and the immensity of MacArthur from the discussion of SCAP's censorship policies.
The discussion about the Tokyo war crimes trials is also quite illuminating. "[The proceedings] called attention to the fact that the recent war in Asia had taken place not among free and independent nations, but rather on a map overwhelmingly demarcated by the colors of colonialism...The tribunal essentially resolved the contradiction between the world of colonialism and imperialism and the righteous ideals of crimes against peace and humanity by ignoring it. Japan's aggression was presented as a criminal act without provocation, without parallel, and almost entirely without context." (470-471). The trials did produce one star - the Indian Justice Rodhabinod Pal (one of only two Asians on the 11-justice Allied tribunal). He had harsh things to say about the way the Allies, and in particular the US, prosecuted the war (for example, "in the war in Asia the only act comparable to Nazi atrocities was perpetrated by the leaders of the United States" in their decision to use nuclear weapons (473-474) - events still pregnant with controversy). He also viewed as hypocritical the Allies' indignation over Japan's aggressive aggrandizement, as their militant expansion was characterized. While I disagree, clinging to my sense of Western values, I can see how those on the receiving end of the West's moral largesse could embrace his argument.

In the months preceding the war in Iraq members of the Bush Administration reportedly were reading this book for pointers. (The extended quote from Bonner F. Fellers on 282-283 could have been written in 2003 for Ba'athist Iraq rather than in 1944 for Imperial Japan.) There are parallels between the two conflicts, to be sure. An obvious similarity is the US's role in post-war Iraq. "From start to finish, the United States alone determined basic policy and exercised decisive command over all aspects of the occupation" (73). It will be the same in Iraq vis-à-vis the other Coalition powers, not to mention the UN. An obvious dissimilarity is the situation after hostilities ended. Total war left the Japan and the Japanese devastated. Iraq was the opposite. This is the first time in history, as far as I know, that an invading force toppled a regime with minimal death and destruction of the civilian populace and the nation's infrastructure.

In the end, this book promises hope. As we look towards an uncertain future with anti-Americanism growing and our War on Terror stretching in front of us indefinitely, we can draw hope from WWII-era Japan. Here was a nation with virulent militarism playing the cultural and race card. We destroyed them and they eventually became fast allies, even if born only of convenience. So it will be, hopefully, in Iraq; maybe (sans the hostilities) in dar al-Islam in general. We've done it before; and for all of our mistakes then and to come, we can do it again.

(Quoting from Emil L. Posey, USA)